Non-GAAP Disclosures and Board of Directors Compensation

Resumo

O objetivo deste artigo é analisar a associação entre a remuneração do conselho de administração e a probabilidade de divulgação de medidas de lucros non-GAAP pelas empresas brasileiras listadas no Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão - [B]3 , no período de 2010 a 2020. A amostra analisada é composta por 271 empresas, possuindo 2.093 observações firmas-ano. Para alcançar o objetivo proposto foram utilizados dois procedimentos econométricos. Inicialmente, para analisar a probabilidade de divulgação do EBITDA utilizou-se um modelo com estimação Logit. Na sequência, para dar robustez aos resultados, os dados foram rodados por meio de Mínimos Quadrados Ordinários com efeitos fixos e controle de setor. As variáveis utilizadas no estudo foram coletadas nos documentos arquivados na CVM, também utilizou-se a Refinitv Eikon®. Para identificar a divulgação ou não do EBITDA pelas empresas, foram analisadas os press releases divulgados e arquivados no site de RI ou na CVM. Os resultados dos modelos econométricos evidenciaram que a remuneração do conselho de administração aumenta, em média, a probabilidade da firma divulgar a medida non-GAAP EBITDA em 26%. No entanto, a probabilidade de divulgação do EBITDA é reduzida em 41% quando a firma apresenta prejuízo no exercício e esse prejuízo é maior que o prejuízo do ano anterior. As demais variáveis GAAP não foram estatisticamente significantes, logo pode-se concluir que o aumento nos lucros não influenciou diretamente na divulgação do EBITDA. Além disto, quantitativamente, observa-se uma redução na divulgação do EBITDA nos exercícios de 2019 e 2020. Desta forma, este estudo contribui para os diversos usuários da informação contábil, em especial, lança um olhar sobre o problema de agência, ao fornecer evidências relacionadas à remuneração do agente e a divulgação de informações – redução da assimetria informacional, ao principal. Além disto, fornece evidências sobre as medidas non-GAAP para os órgãos normativos contábeis, nacional e internacional.

Palavras-chave: Remuneração. Conselho de administração. Medidas non-GAAP. EBITDA.

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to analyze the association between board remuneration and the probability of disclosure of non-GAAP earnings measures by Brazilian companies listed in Brazil, Bolsa, Balcão - [B]3, in the period from 2010 to 2020. The analyzed sample is composed of 271 companies, with 2,093 firm-year observations. To achieve the proposed objective, two econometric procedures were used. Initially, to analyze the probability of EBITDA disclosure, a model with Logit estimation was used. Then, to give robustness to the results, the data were rotated using Ordinary Least Squares with fixed effects and sector control. The variables used in the study were collected from documents filed with the CVM, and Refinitv Eikon® was also used. To identify the disclosure or not of EBITDA by the companies, the press releases published and filed on the IR website or at the CVM were analyzed. The results of the econometric models showed that the remuneration of the board of directors increases, on average, the probability of the firm disclosing the non-GAAP EBITDA measure by 26%. However, the probability of EBITDA disclosure is reduced by 41% when the firm has a loss for the year and this loss is greater than the loss of the previous year. The other GAAP variables were not statistically significant, so it can be concluded that the increase in earnings did not directly influence the EBITDA disclosure. In addition, quantitatively, there is a reduction in the disclosure of EBITDA in the years 2019 and 2020. In this way, this study contributes to the various users of accounting information, in particular, it takes a look at the agency problem, by providing evidence related to the agent’s remuneration and the disclosure of information – reduction of information asymmetry, to the principal. In addition, it provides evidence on non-GAAP measures for accounting standards bodies, nationally and internationally.

Keywords: Remuneration. Administrative Council. Non-GAAP Measures. EBITDA.

Referências

Bansal, N.; Seetharaman, A.; Wang, X. F. (2013). Managerial risk-taking incentives and non-GAAP earnings disclosures. Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, v. 9, n. 1, p. 100–121. Beekes, W., & Brown, P. (2006). Do better-governed Australian firms make more informative disclosures. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 33(3–4), 422–450. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2006.00614.x Bhattacharya, N., Black, E. L., Christensen, T. E., & Larson, C. R. (2003). Assessing the relative informativeness and permanence of pro forma earnings and GAAP operating earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36(1-3), 285-319. Black, D. E.; Black, E. L.; Christensen, T. E. (2018). The Use of Non-GAAP Performance Metrics for Compensation Contracting and Financial Reporting. Black, D. E.; Christensen, T. E. (2009). US managers’ use of “pro forma” adjustments to meet strategic earnings targets. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, v. 36, n. 3–4, p. 297–326. Bradshaw, M. T., & Sloan, R. (2002). GAAP versus the Street: An empirical assessment of two alternative definitions of earnings. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(1), 41–66. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.00038 Brown, L. D., & Sivakumar, K. (2003). Comparing the value relevance of two operating income measures. Review of Accounting Studies, 8(4), 561–572. https:// doi.org/10.1023/A:1027328418571 Charitou, A., Floropoulos, N., Karamanou, I., & Loizides, G. (2018). Non-GAAP earnings disclosures on the face of the income statement by UK firms: The effect on market liquidity. The International Journal of Accounting, 53(3), 183-202. Christensen, T. E., Pei, H., Pierce, S. R., & Tan, L. (2019). Non-GAAP reporting following debt covenant violations. Review of Accounting Studies, 24(2), 629–664. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-019-09492-1 Comissão de Valores Mobiliários – CVM (2012). Instrução nº 527/12, de 04 de Outubro de 2012. Dispõe sobre a divulgação voluntária de informações de natureza não contábil denominadas LAJIDA e LAJIR. Rio de Janeiro, 2012a. Acesso em 15/06/2021. Coulton, J., Ribeiro, A., Shan, Y., & Taylor, S. (2016). The rise and rise of non-GAAP disclosure: A survey of Australian practice and its implications. Chartered accountants Australia and New Zealand and Center for international finance and regulation. Cormier, D., Demaria, S., & Magnan, M. (2017). Beyond earnings: do EBITDA reporting and governance matter for market participants?. Managerial finance. Cormier, D.; Lapointe-Antunes, P.; Magnan, M. (2011) Revisiting the relevance and reliability of non-GAAP reporting: The case of the income trusts. Contempo- rary Accounting Research, v. 28, n. 5, p. 1585–1609. Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1996). Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research, 13(1), 1–36. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.1996.tb00489.x Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Agency problems and residual claims. The journal of law and Economics, 26(2), 327-349. Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (2005). Agency Problems and Residual Claims. SSRNElectronic Journal, XXVI(June), 327–349.https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.94032 Frankel, R.; McVay, S.; Soliman, M. Non-GAAP earnings and board independence. Review of Accounting Studies, v. 16, n. 4, p. 719–744, 2011. Grey, C.; Stathopoulos, K.; Walker, M. International Review of Financial Analysis The impact of executive pay on the disclosure of alternative earnings per share figures. International Review of Financial Analysis, 2012. Guillamon-Saorin, E., Isidro, H., & Marques, A. (2017). Impression Management and Non-GAAP Disclosure in Earnings Announcements. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 44(3–4), 448–479. https://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12238 Huang, Q., & Skantz T. R. The informativeness of pro forma and street earnings: an examination of information asymmetry around earnings announcements. [s.l.] Springer US, 2016. v. 21 Instituto Brasileiro de Governança Corporativa. (IBGC). Código das Melhores Práticas de Governança Corporativa. In Instituto Brasileiro de Governança Corporativa, 2015. http://www.ibgc.org.br/userfiles/2014/files/CMPGPT.pdf Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305- 360.Jensen, M. C. (1993). The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems. The Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831–880. https:// doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x Karamanou, I., & Vafeas, N. (2005). The association between corporate boards, audit committees, and management earnings forecasts: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting Research, 43(3), 453–486. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679X.2005.00177.x KPMG. Divulgações contábeis 2016: um estudo sobre as políticas contábeis críticas, medições não contábeis e as modificações no relatório do auditor independente. Brasil, 2016. Disponível em: https://bit.ly/3qdElo4. Acesso em: 18 out. 2020. Lont, D. H.; Ranasinghe, D., & Roberts, H. Non-GAAP Disclosures and CEO Pay Levels. International Journal of Accounting, v. 55, n. 4, 2020.Lougee, B. a, & Marquardt, C. a. (2004). An Disclosure : Empirical Examination of “ Pro Earnings Earnings. The Accounting ReviewReview, 79(3), 769–795. Marques, A. Disclosure strategies among S&P 500 firms: Evidence on the disclosure of non-GAAP financial measures and financial statements in earnings press releases. British Accounting Review, v. 42, n. 2, p. 119–131, 2010. Moscariello, N., & Pizzo, M. (Eds.). (2019). Reporting Non-GAAP financial measures: a theoretical and empirical analysis in Europe. Cambridge Scholars Pu- blishing. Scott, W. R. (2015). Financial Accounting Theory Sevent Edition. United States: Canada Cataloguing. Venter, E. R., Emanuel, D., & Cahan, S. F. (2014). The value relevance of mandatory non-GAAP earnings. Abacus, 50(1), 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1111/abac.12020 Wooldridge, J. M. (2015). Introductory econometrics: A modern approach. Cengage learning. Xu, B.; Bhuiyan, M. B. U.; & Rahman, A. Underlying profit in New Zealand. Pacific Accounting Review, v. 28, n. 2, p. 111–134, 2016.